1917 between a British and an Italian ship, due mainly to the negligence of the master and crew of the former. The Italian ship was repaired temporarily at Gibraltar and permanently at Newport News, Virginia. During the periods of the repairs the owners of the Italian ship lost an amount by way of hire which would have been paid by the Italian Government. Their total claim in respect of these repairs and losses was for 304,418 lire. Before the hearing the lira depreciated in relation to the pound sterling. The House of Lords (Lord Carson dissenting) held that the claim must be converted into sterling at the rate of exchange prevailing when each item of loss or damage was incurred.
In the previous year the Court of Appeal had held in Di Ferdinando v.
Simon, Smits & Co. 6 that damages for breach of contract must be converted into sterling at the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of breach, notwithstanding a 50% depreciation of the lira (the money of account) between that day and the day of judgment. These two cases settled the English law as to the conversion date for damages for tort and for breach of contract respectively. At first sight they seem discrepant, since in the Volturno case the date chosen was the date when the items of loss or damage were incurred, while in the Di Ferdinando case it was the date of the breach. But in that case the claim was for non-delivery of goods under a contract of carriage, so that the date of breach and the date for assessing the damages were the same. Had the claim been for consequential loss suffered at a date later than the date of breach, that later date might well have been selected as the date for conversion. Though the law was thus settled for claims for damages for tort and for breach of contract, doubts remained for another 40 years as to what should be the conversion date in claims for a liquidated debt. These doubts persisted largely because of two decisions of the Court of Appeal which appeared to be inconsistent, or at least difficult to reconcile: Socitt des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plage v the plaintiff was a French company, the defendant was an Englishwoman, the debt was expressed in French francs, and French francs depreciated in terms of sterling between the date when the debt became due and the date of the hearing. In the Cummings case the defendant paid the amount of the debt in French francs to the plaintiff's manager after the issue of the writ and before the hearing. It was held that she had discharged her debt and that no further payment was due from her for the difference in sterling value between the amount of the debt in French francs in 1914 (when the debt was payable) and 1921 (when the case was heard). The inference is that had she not paid the debt, the conversion date would have been held to be the date of judgment. the writ, the sterling equivalent of the debt at the date of payment; and this time it was held that she remained liable to pay the difference between this sterling sum and the sterling equivalent of the amount of the debt at the time when it was due. The inference is that had she not made any payment into court, the conversion date would have been held to be the date when the debt became payable.
In Cummings v. London Bullion Co. 10 it was argued that these two decisions were inconsistent and that the Court of Appeal was therefore entitled to choose between them; but the court preferred to rest its decision on another ground. The plaintiff, an American tourist temporarily in England, bought a platinum brooch from the defendant as a present for his wife for $3200. It was agreed that if the wife did not like the brooch, the plaintiff could return it and get his money back. This case seemed to have settled the English law once and for all, for good or for ill. But nothing is settled law nowadays, not even when it is laid down in a recent and unanimous decision of the House of Lords.
It can scarcely be doubted that the rule thus laid down was an unjust rule, because it made an anomalous and unnecessary exception to the principle of nominalism, which "of all the principles which govern the treatment of money obligations in this country . . . . is the most fundamental." 1 7 If a debt is expressed in foreign currency, both parties expect to measure their rights and obligations in terms of that currency and no other. The creditor should bear the risk of a depreciation of that currency after the date of maturity of the debt; the debtor should bear the risk of its appreciation. Yet if the creditor can (or must) bring his action in England, e.g. because the debtor is resident there or is not resident anywhere else, it may be just the other way round, because the debt has to be converted into sterling at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date when it became payable. Hence, if the foreign currency depreciates in terms of sterling after that date, the creditor recovers more than the debtor promised to pay, while if it appreciates, he recovers less. In federal courts in the United States (except in diversity cases), a better rule was laid down by a bare majority of the Supreme Court in Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey.' s The rule of that case is that if the debt is expressed in foreign currency, and is payable abroad, it must be converted into dollars at the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of judgment. The rule is better than the English rule because, if the foreign currency is appreciating, the creditor does not suffer so big a loss. But it is far from ideal because, owing perhaps to a series of appeals, a considerable interval may still elapse between the date of judgment and the date of execution or payment. In his opinion in this case, Holmes J. So the arbitrator did what was just. But the judge felt compelled to overthrow his award. In the name of the law, the judge has denied justice to the parties. He realised that by so doing he might imperil the "international acceptability of Lloyd's standard form": but he thought the danger could be removed by an appropriate amendment of the form. I fear he may be too optimistic. Lloyd's form has hitherto been internationally acceptable because men of all nations have been confident they could get justice in London at the hands of English arbitrators. But once justice is denied, confidence is lost. And once confidence is lost, it is hard to restore. I would not myself expose Lloyd's form to the risk. I would do herein what is just and not what is unjust. I would allow the appeal.
To this thunderbolt, the majority could only reply (rather feebly), "I cannot agree that the confidence of foreign salvors and owners in the justice administered by our courts can be shaken by the fact that in this particular case the decision of the court is in accordance with the established rule of English law."
' 3 1 "Having regard to the agreement reached between the parties, I am unable to accept that the judgment appealed from has denied them justice."
3
The Teh Hu came before the courts by way of case stated by the arbitrator; and the judgments of the Court of Appeal contain conflicting dicta on a point which had never been decided, namely, whether an English arbitrator could express his award in a foreign currency. Lord Denning said that he could; ) not only that the arbitrators could make their award in United States dollars, but also that the award could be enforced "in the same manner as a judgment" under section 26 of the Arbitration Act 1950, that is, without the plaintiffs having to bring an action on the award at common law. All three judges pointed out how anomalous it would be if a foreign award (which would probably be expressed in foreign currency) could be summarily enforced (under section 36 of the Act), but a domestic award expressed in foreign currency could not.
3 6 Roskill L.J. regarded the rule that judgments must be for an amount expressed in sterling as "now established The second reason for the decision (from which Lawton L.J. dissented) was that the court was not bound to follow the United Railways case because cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (when the reason for a rule of law ceases to exist, the rule ceases to bind). Of these two reasons for distinguishing or declining to follow the United Railways case, it is enough to say that the House of Lords in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. 4° regarded both as totally inadequate. The next and most important case is the Miliangos case, which also was an action against an English buyer for the price of goods sold; but this time the seller was a Swiss, so the Treaty of Rome point was not available, Switzerland being outside the European Economic Community. The price was quoted in Swiss francs and Swiss law was the proper law of the contract. The sterling equivalent of the price was £42,000 in 1971 when payment was due and £60,000 in 1974 at the date of the hearing. The writ was issued in 1972. The buyer counter-claimed for damages for breach of warranty as to quality. In November 1974 the buyer abandoned his defense and counterclaim. A few days later, after the Schorsch Meier case was decided, the Swiss seller asked for and obtained leave to amend his statement of claim so as to ask for judgment in Swiss francs. The first ratio of the Schorsch Meier case was irrelevant because Switzerland is not a member of the E.E.C. The second ratio placed the trial judge (Bristow J.) in something of a dilemma. On the one hand there was the unanimous decision of the House of Lords in the United Railways case which clearly precluded him from giving judgment in Swiss francs or from awarding the sterling equivalent of the price converted at any other date than the date when the price was due. On the other hand there was the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in Schorsch Meier which had declined to apply the United Railwas decision. In these embarrassing circumstances, Bristow J. held that the second reason for the decision in Schorsch Meier must have been given per incuriam; and he gave judgment for the sterling equivalent of the price at the date when it was due, i.e. £42,000. He remarked: First, I do not think that this is a 'law reform' which should or can properly be imposed by judges; it is, on the contrary, essentially a decision which demands a far wider range of review than is available to courts following our traditional and valuable adversary system-the sort of review compassed by an The instant appeal raises questions the answer to which imperatively demands the contribution of expertise from far outside the law-on monetary theory, public finance, international finance, commerce, industry, economics -for which judges have no training and no special qualification merely by their aptitude for judicial office. All such experience as I have had of decision-making within and without the law convinces me that the resolution of this issue demands a far greater range of advice and a far more generally based knowledge than is available to a court of law-even one assisted, as we have been, by the most meticulous, cogent and profound argument of counsel. Law is too serious a matter to be left exclusively to judges.
One cannot leave this case without reflecting how much the development of the law depends on the accidents of litigation. Had the three cases of Jugoslavenska, Schorsch Meier and Miliangos come before the courts in the reverse order, the decision in Miliangos might well have gone the other way, because of course the Treaty of Rome point was not available, and the Jugoslavenska case would have been still below the horizon. In that event, even Lord Denning might have hesitated before distinguishing Miliangos in Schorsch Meier because of the Treaty of Rome point. And in that event it seems highly probable that theJugoslavenska case would also have gone the other way.
As a precedent, the decision in the Miliangos case was expressly confined to claims for a liquidated debt expressed in foreign currency in cases where the proper law of the contract is that of a foreign country and where the money of account and of payment is that of that country or possibly of some third country outside the United Kingdom. 45 The House of Lords expressly declined to review the whole field of the law regarding foreign currency obligations, leaving it open to future discussion whether the same rule should apply to claims for damages for tort or breach of contract. It has subsequently been held that the court can give judgment for an amount in foreign currency as damages for breach of contract 46 or for tort. 47 It has also been held that the principle of Miliangos applies even though the proper law of the contract is English law. 4s This is in accordance with principle, because the rule of Miliangos (like its predecessor, now overruled) is a rule of the English law of procedure, and therefore the proper law of the contract, the place of payment or (in a tort case) the place of tort should all be irrelevant.
In Miliangos the majority of the House of Lords adopted the formula that had been devised by Lord Denning in the Schorsch Meier case, namely, that if the plaintiff claims an amount in foreign currency, judgment may be given for that sum or the sterling equivalent at the time of payment, i.e. the date when the court authorizes enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling. 49 As Lord Wilberforce put it, "This date gets nearest to securing to the creditor exactly what he bargained for. ' 71 (1977) , art. 17(5): "Money judgments entitled to enforcement under the Convention may be enforced by the court addressed either in the currency specified in the judgment or in the local currency at the buying rate in the place where and on the date when enforcement is granted under paragraph (1) of Article 16 or registration for enforcement is effected under paragraph (2) of Article 16."
